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Coleridge’s Failed Quest:
 
The Anticlimax of Fancy/Imagination in
 Biographia Literaria
Eugene L. Stelzig
SUNY Geneseo
He began anywhere: you put some question to him, made some sugges
­
tive observation: instead of answering this, or decidedly setting out
 towards answer 
of
 it, he would accumulate formidable apparatus, logical  
swim-bladders, transcendental life-preservers and other precautionary
 and vehiculatory gear, for setting out; perhaps did at last get underway,
 — but was swiftly solicited, turned aside by the glance of some radiant
 new game on this hand or that, into new courses; and ever into new, and
 before long into all the Universe, 
where
 it was uncertain what game you  
would catch, or whether any.
Carlyle, “Portraits of His Contemporaries”
I
T. S. Eliot’
s
 assertion in a 1956 lecture still represents the contem ­
porary consensus: “the criticism of to-day... may be said to be in direct
 descent from Coleridge.”1 Coleridge is
 
the founding father of modern  
Anglo-American criticism, even if at times he did no more than intro
­duce the currency of German idealism, sometimes passed off as his
 own, into the
 
vaults of English thought. Indeed, could it be seriously  
argued that any concept at
 
the back of modern criticism has been as  
important as Coleridge’s imagination theory? And this brings me to
 the subject of my essay: if the famous conclusion of the first volume of
 the Biographia is a touchstone of modern criticism, the regularity
 with which it is anthologized demonstrates something about the
 reception of Coleridge’
s
 testament of his literary life. Biographia Lit ­
eraria is known largely for a few scattered passages of practical
 criticism and for a number of brilliant but difficult definitions of a
 philosophical/aesthetic nature. Coleridge’
s
 method, or lack of  it, in  
his literary quasi-autobiography encourages such an approach (he
 himself called it “so immethodical a miscellany”2) but the miscellane
­ous, excerpting approach signally distorts the true character of his
 essay. The context of questioning and uncertainty in which his
 thought-formulae are imbedded is overlooked, and the well-known
 phrases are made to function with a finality which the open-minded
 and ever-hesitant Coleridge may not have intended, and which,
 moreover, is not warranted by the overall tenor of the work. There is
 something paradoxical about such a treatment of a thinker one of
 whose basic aesthetic premises is “organic form.” To dissever parts of
 the Biographia is to deny in practice Coleridge’s vitalist aesthetics: “a
 living body is of necessity an organized 
one,
 — and what is  organiza-
1
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tion but the connection
 
of parts to a whole, so that each part is at once  
end and means.”3
In the following pages I wish to re-embody the most
 
famous and  
most frequently severed part, the fancy-imagination distinction, and
 to
 
examine the relationship of part to whole which in Coleridge’ s own  
terms is tantamount to
 
seeing the “organization” of the work for what  
it is. An open-minded reading of this work in terms of its overall
 structure must admit that it contains not only the highlights of
 impressive insight but also elements of the absurd. The author of
 Biographia Literaria
 
is something of a literary prankster and  escape  
artist: Coleridge on imagination has been taken too seriously by most
 modern scholars and critics.4 Instead of radically over- or underesti
­mating his true stature, we
 
are starting to see the Inquiring Spirit in a  
truer perspective. From his
 
earliest ventures in poetry and prose to the  
grand mirage of the Logosophia or grand synthesis that kept always
 receding just beyond the horizons of the possible during his final
 decade, the gap between promise and performance in Coleridge’
s
 life  
and works is so large that it makes him a unique figure
 
among major  
English writers. Whatever unity the Biographia Literaria may have is
 not to be found in the execution of the work, which is pretentiously,
 albeit feebly, propped up from the start to collapse disastrously by the
 end
 
of volume I. The deeper, Romantic coherence of the book lies in the  
conception only. The conception, indeed, is as magnificent as the
 execution is bungled. Like Hamlet, Coleridge here has that within
 which passes show. It does not see the light of day, although Coleridge
 makes a number of grandiloquent gestures in the attempt to deliver
 the goods he has promised — and promised, and promised. The author
 of the
 
Biographia  struts self-importantly to  the center of the stage; he  
informs his audience that he has come to tell them all, but shortly
 before the climax of his presentation, he makes a clumsy exit. The
 conception behind Coleridge’
s
 discussion  of imagination merges into  
infinite spaces, the performance can be bounded in a nutshell. As in
 the drama of Hamlet, whose character Coleridge understood more
 fully than any other, including his own, delay, postponement and
 anticlimax are the typical features of his mind and art.
II
Coleridge dictated the Biographia between July and September
 2
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1815 as a preface
 
to a new edition of his poems. It soon turned into an  
informal meditation on characteristic themes that can be summed up
 under
 
the word, imagination, which is the central idea pervading the  
book. Volume I is meant to lead up to and culminate with a detailed
 philosophical presentation of a
 
theory of imagination, and volume II  
is
 
designed to ground the theory back in the actual, and the abstract in  
the concrete, through its close examination of Wordsworth’
s
 poetry: to  
Coleridge, Wordsworth is the chief modern poet whose works will give
 a local habitation and a name to that “plastic power” obscurely
 hymned in
 
Biographia Literaria. Thus the two volumes are meant to  
complement, and in a sense, complete one another. Coleridge had been
 thinking
 
about imagination for a decade and a half before his attempt  
to define it in the Biographia. The first mention of the fancy
­imagination distinction occurs in a well-known letter of 1802: “Fancy,
 or the aggregating Faculty of the mind — not Imagination, or the
 modifying, and co-adunating Faculty.”5 Typically, Coleridge defers
 the exposition of one of his leading notions for
 
so long that when he  
does get around to the task, it has become such a burden that his heart
 sinks under him, and he feels compelled to arm himself with much
 prefatory matter, only to suffer a decisive failure of nerve when the
 momentous
 
encounter can no longer be postponed. What a trickster he  
can be in his peregrinations
 
on the road to imagination! Certainly his  
introductory paragraph is not reliable but positively misleading as an
 indication of
 
the “motives of the present work”:
It has been 
my
 lot to have had my name introduced, both in conversation  
and in print, more frequently than I find it easy to explain, whether I
 consider the fewness, unimportance and limited circulation of my writ
­ings, or the retirement and distance in which 
I
 have lived, both from the  
literary and political world. Most 
often
 it has been connected with s m  
charge which I could not acknowledge, 
or
 some principle which I had  
never entertained. Nevertheless, had 
I
 had no other motive or incite ­
ment, the reader would not have been troubled with this exculpation.
 What my additional purposes were will be 
seen
 in the following pages. It  
will be found that the least of what 
I
 have written concerns myself  
personally. I have used the narration 
chiefly
 for the purposes of giving  
continuity 
to
 the work, in part for the sake of miscellaneous reflections  
suggested 
to
 me by particular events; but still more as introductory to the  
statement of my principles in politics, religion and philosophy, and the
 application of the rules deduced from philosophical principles to 
poetry and criticism. But of the objects which I have proposed to myself, it was
 not the least important to effect, as far as possible, a settlement of the
 
3
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long-continued controversy concerning the true nature of poetic diction,
 
and at the same time to define with utmost impartiality the real poetic
 character 
of
 the poet by whose writings this controversy was first  
kindled and has been since fuelled and fanned (Biographia Literaria, p.
1). 
In view of
 
the actual contents of the book, this  introduction is a  
curious hodge-podge. After a note of exaggerated humility, the author
 suggests that he is going to attempt a defense of his life and works. But
 then he gives himself a blank check as far as other “purposes” are
 concerned. The effusion of authorial benevolence is followed with the
 claim that he is going to use an autobiographical format to give
 narrative continuity to his book. The psychogenetic method will allow
 him to suggest miscellaneous topics
 
(again the blank check) as well as  
lead up to a
 
statement of his principles in politics, religion, and philo ­
sophy. But where in the Biographia is
 
there any such comprehensive  
statement? And can anyone claim in good conscience that he
 “deduced” from philosophical principles the “application of rules” to
 poetry and criticism? Coleridge has again confounded intention
 
with  
achievement. Only the last sentence is valid as summary, for
 
in the  
second volume he does produce a discussion of the “controversy con
­cerning the true nature of poetic diction,” as well as what is in some
 respects still the best analysis of “the real poetic character of
 Wordsworth.”
The inaccuracy of the opening, which claims at once too much and
 
not enough, and which provides
 
only a confused focus on the chapters  
that follow, may serve as an index of Coleridge’
s 
erratic procedure in  
the Biographia generally. His statement of “motives” fails in fact
 
to  
mention his fundamental concern with the theory of imagination.
 This does
 
not surface until  Chapter IV, where it is  acknowledged that  
Wordsworth’s
 
poetry first led Coleridge to those repeated meditations  
which paved the way for the fancy-imagination distinction. What first
 struck
 
him so forcibly in Wordsworth’ s poetry “was the union of deep  
feeling with profound thought; the fine balance of truth in observing
 with
 
the imaginative faculty in modifying the objects observed....” (p.  
48) Coleridge goes on to say that “repeated meditations” on “this
 excellence, which in all 
Mr.
 Wordsworth’ s writings is more or less  
predominant and which constitutes the character of his mind... led me
 first to suspect... that fancy and imagination were two distinct and
 widely different faculties, instead of being, according to the general
 
4
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belief, either two names with one meaning, or at furthest the lower and
 
higher degree of one and the same power.” (pp. 49-50)
Coleridge’s “first and most important point” is his desire to
 
“desynonymize ... two conceptions perfectly distinct [fancy
­imagination] ...
 
confused under one and the same word.”  Thus only in  
Chapter IV does he come around to the real subject of Volume I.
 Through the systematic discrimination of
 
fancy from imagination  
“the theory of the fine
 
arts and of poetry in particular could not...  but  
derive some additional
 
and important light. It would in its immediate  
effects furnish a torch of guidance to the philosophical critic, and
 ultimately
 
to the poet himself.”  (p. 51) With a peculiar blend of vanity  
and humility, Coleridge adds that “metaphysics and psychology have
 long been my hobbyhorse,” and that “there was a time, certainly, in
 which I took some little credit to myself in the belief that I had been the
 first of
 
my countrymen who had pointed out the diverse meaning of  
which the two terms
 
were capable and analysed the faculties to which  
they should be appropriated.” We are to appreciate that STC is an
 original thinker: he has already informed us that he got his basic
 insight from reading Wordsworth’s poetry, but he wishes to make it
 plain that the fancy-imagination theory is not indebted more directly
 than that to the author of the Preface to Lyrical Ballads:
The explanation which Mr. Wordsworth has himself given will be found
 
to 
differ
 from mine chiefly, perhaps, as our objects are different.... it was  
Mr. Wordsworth’s purpose to consider the influences of fancy and imagi
­nation as they are manifested in poetry, and from the different effects to
 conclude their diversity in kind; 
while
 it is my object to investigate the  
seminal principle, and then from the kind to deduce the degree. My friend
 has drawn a masterly sketch of the branches with their poetic fruitage. I
 wish to add the trunk, and even the 
roots,
 as far as they lift themselves  
above the ground and are visi le to the naked eye of our common con ­
sciousness (p. 52).
Clearly Coleridge
 
intends to get to the bottom of this matter in a  
way that nobody has ever done before. And so, at the conclusion of
 Chapter IV he begins to gird up his loins for the encounter with
 Imagination. He winds up the chapter with a curious array of self
­serving disclaimers, warnings, and equivocations (pp. 52-53), the
 upshot being that he has committed himself to “this labour” of for
­mally expounding his theory. Like Wordsworth at the end of Book I of
 The Prelude, Coleridge has finally adumbrated his true subject. He is
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big with its conception; he will give us the hard “deductions” that will
 
either produce fundamental conviction or be capable
 
of fundamental  
confutation. The road lies plain before him. Or does it?
III
As the puzzled readers
 
of Biographia Literaria can testify, it does  
not. With the
 
first step the philosopher-poet  takes toward his theory,  
he begins stepping away from it.
 
Caught in an expository dilemma, he  
fails at first to recognize that he is approaching the subject from a
 tangent that will eventually get him side-tracked in a maze of his own
 myriad-mindedness. In Chapter V Coleridge recoils so that he may
 strike the better, but in subsequent chapters he keeps recoiling farther
 and farther, to the point that when he finally decides to take up his
 central argument “on the imagination” he is exhausted and out of
 striking distance — the recoil has become a rout. The chief impasse
 Coleridge finds himself in is that he feels compelled to acquaint
 
his  
readers with the
 
philosophical territory  he has traversed on the road  
to imagination. He has already acknowledged Wordsworth’
s
 poetry  
as a catalyst, but he has not yet mentioned David Hartley’s associa
tional psychology, Coleridge’
s
 reaction to which is the second major  
influence on the genesis of his theory. So
 
at the beginning of Chapter  
V he proceeds to trace his philosophical debts, and in so doing loses  
sight of his
 
primary objective and, like an overzealous historian, falls  
into the psychogenetic trap of
 
regressive recapitulation. Once Cole ­
ridge has succumbed to this, his exposition of imagination is lost, at
 least
 
for the present,  because he cheers himself up with the illusion of  
finishing it — like “Christabel” and “Kubla Khan” —- at some more
 auspicious time.
Coleridge could have accounted for the importance of his obliga
­
tions to Hartley in a few pages, but instead he drifts off for three
 chapters on a tedious disquisition, beginning with “the law of associa
­tion — Its history traced from Aristotle to Hartley.” This title is the
 beginning of the end: ostensibly projected as a bridge to his imagina
­tion theory, the discussion will turn into a catch-all. It is too bad for
 Coleridge and his readers that he
 
succumbs to  a  Shandyan retrogres ­
sion. Doubtless, his initial enchantment with and subsequent reaction
 against Hartley’
s
 system is crucial to an understanding of the devel ­
opment of his concept of the imagination. His valid intention is to
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demonstrate that associationist psychology is inapplicable to the
 
higher reaches of the mind. In striving to trace the history of associa
tionism from Aristotle to its authoritative modern version in Hartley’s
 
Observations on Man (1749) that had enlisted the
 
young Coleridge’s  
enthusiastic allegiance, he is trying to undermine
 
the radical empiri ­
cal foundations of eighteenth-century English psychology that in
 Hartley’
s
 source-book accounted for all mental and emotional pro ­
cesses through the law of the association of
 
ideas. Coleridge’ s even ­
tual reaction against Hartleyan psychology helped him as much as
 his reading of Wordsworth’
s
 poetry in evolving his concept of the  
imagination because he came to perceive that associational psychol
­ogy mistakes a part of the mind for the whole. The fancy-imagination
 distinction is founded on the insight that Hartley’s mind-picture is
 reductive because applicable only to lower thought-processes, which
 may be adequately understood under the mode of fancy, “the aggrega
­tive and associative power.” What Coleridge calls fancy English phi
­losophers from Hobbes and Locke on up to the eighteenth-century
 psychologists had equated with imagination. Coleridge wished to
 desynonymize the
 
words because the  lower mode of fancy  is not ade ­
quate to explain the genesis and production of a work of art, which
 depends on imagination or the “shaping and modifying power.”
 Fancy is nothing but 
“
memory emancipated from the order of time  
and space” and “must receive all its materials ready made from the
 law of association.” But the (esemplastic) Romantic imagination can
­not be summed up in such limited terms, because it does not
 
receive  
sense impressions passively (the empirical model), but actively trans
­forms them
 
into something wondrous, rich, and strange (the idealist  
model). For Coleridge, in short, the laws of imagination begin to
 operate only on a level on which the laws of fancy cease to apply.
The difficult and fragmentary distinction at the end of Volume I,
 
the key to his critical theories and the subject of much on-going
 controversy, has its origins, then, in his ambivalent relations to
 
Har
tleyan associationism as much as in his initial response to Words
­worth’s poetry. But instead of concisely setting forth the significance
 of the former to his theory, Coleridge begins to lose himself in a
 pedantic history of associationism; and this, as we discover to our
 dismay,
 
serves in turn only as the prelude to further digressions which  
dramatize what Fruman has described as Coleridge’s “failures to
 pursue an argument to a conclusion.” (Coleridge, the Damaged
7
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Archangel, p. 79) These failures are amply demonstrated in
 
the five  
chapters sandwiched between the three on association and the fancy
­imagination paragraphs at the end of Volume I, and which reveal on a
 large scale the collapse of the exposition in the first half of the
 Biographia. 
Coleridge widens the scope of his discussion in Chapter VIII,
 
beginning with “the system of Dualism introduced by Des Cartes”
 and wending his way from Leibniz to Hylozoism. To compound the
 problem
 
that the center will not hold and that things are falling apart,  
he employs a discursive style that comes close to being a parody of
 philosophical argument. And he
 
begins to digress even from his  
digressions. Chapter IX opens with one of the unanswerable ques
­tions: “Is philosophy possible as a science, and what are its condi
­tions?” and proceeds to discourse on his intellectual obligations,
 especially to the “Teutonic theosophist, Jacob Behmen,” and to the
 
“
illustrious sage of Koenigsberg, the founder of the Critical Philo ­
sophy,” the “clearness and evidence” of whose works “took posses
­sion” of Coleridge’
s
 mind “as with a giant’s hand.” (p. 84) From thence  
he proceeds to the thorny problem of his borrowings from the Ger
­mans, only to conclude with the famous disclaimer, “I regard truth as
 divine ventriloquist” — another instance of Coleridge giving himself
 a blank check. Having trekked to Chapter X, we discover that he drops
 all pretence of being still on target: “A chapter of digression and
 anecdotes, as an interlude preceding that on the nature and genesis of
 the imagination or plastic power.” After nearly forty pages of anec
­dotes (the best about “Spy Nozy”) we arrive rather the worse for wear
 at Chapter XI, only to be told that we are not, after all, to have the
 promised chapter, but instead “an affectionate exhortation to those
 who in early life feel themselves disposed to become authors.” And
 once we have finished this,, we find that Coleridge disappoints us
 further with the delaying action of “a chapter of requests and premo
­nitions [only
 
too well  founded] concerning, the perusal of omission of  
the chapter
 
that follows.” One does not have to read  it  to realize that  
by now his prolonged stalling has become absurd.
 Chapter XII is a prime example of Coleridgean mystification. He
 
opens by putting the reader in his place with the maxim, “until you
 understand a writer’s ignorance, presume yourself ignorant of his
 understanding.” (p. 134) With that
 
put-down of his audience, he goes  
on to request that the reader “will either pass over the following
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Chapter altogether or read the whole connectedly. The fairest part of
 
the most beautiful body will
 
appear deformed and monstrous if disse ­
vered from its
 
place in the organic whole.” (p. 135) With this caution ­
ary preamble, Coleridge enters on an obscure rehash of the
 subject-object dilemma of modern philosophy. Again the English
 philosopher-poet seems a rickety imitation of the German idealists. In
 reading it one
 
is reminded of Carlyle’s account of Coleridge’s conver ­
sation, or of Byron’s description (in the Preface of Don Juan) of
 Coleridge as “a
 
hawk encumbered by his hood, — / Explaining meta ­
physics to the
 
nation — / I wish he would explain his Explanation.”  
Chapter XII culminates with ten heavily inflated
 
“Theses” to sustain  
those “readers who are willing to accompany” him “through the
 following chapter, in which the results will be applied to the deduction
 of the imagination.” (p. 149) But this is followed by a digression on
 Coleridge’s disagreement with Wordsworth’s views on the imagina
­tion (in the Preface of 1815). And then, finally, after the hundred-odd
 pages of digression subsequent to the end of Chapter IV, where he
 announced his intent to “deduce” the imagination, Coleridge will
 begin “Chapter XIII On the imagination, or esemplastic power.”
 
The  
issue is at hand.
IV
I have traced Coleridge’s labyrinthine build-up to this chapter of
 
chapters, the intended pivotal point of the two volumes of Biographia
 Literaria, because I think an overview of his expository method is
 essential to our perception of how his attempt there
 
to make good on  
his promises disintegrates quite absurdly. In the
 
actual organization  
of its argument Chapter XIII deserves the close scrutiny Coleridge
 had
 
repeatedly asked for in the earlier sections, and one that is rarely  
receives from commentators intent only to explain those enigmatic
 passages at the end, often by simplifying whatever meaning they
 have for the sake of a false textbook clarity.6 It opens with more
 mystification in
 
the form of several paragraphs on “the transcenden ­
tal philosophy” of “the venerable Sage of Koenigsberg.” Coleridge’
s desire to lean on a philosophical father figure when the going gets
 tough only serves to aggravate his difficulties, because the transcen
­dental portions he serves up get increasingly indigestible, until we are
 
9
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mercifully released with the sudden collapse of a paragraph in the
 
middle of a sentence: “Now this tertium aliquid can be no other than
 an inter-penetration of the counteracting powers, partaking of both.”
 (p. 164)
 
And here we are, dangling  in the  void of counteracting inter ­
penetration. Even Coleridge must have realized that the metaphysical
 mumbo-jumbo that is to deduce the imagination was becoming pre
­posterous.7 He was trapped, having written
 
eight introductory chap ­
ters only to paint himself into a corner. But rather than face his
 dilemma, Coleridge chooses to employ the rogue’s age-old gimmick for
 squeezing out of a tight spot. He makes a forced exit with a rhetorical
 sleight-of-hand:
Thus far had the work been transcribed 
for
 the press, when I received the  
following letter from a friend whose practical judgement I have ample
 reason to estimate and revere, and whose taste and sensibility preclude
 all the excuses which 
my
 self-love might possibly have prompted me to  
set up in plea against the decision of advisers 
of
 equal good sense, but  
with less tact and feeling (p.164).
This bogus letter from
 
an invented correspondent is a face-saving  
device that renders the last chapter of Volume I ridiculous in a manner
 reminiscent of the literary high jinks of Tristram Shandy. The
 “friend” answers Coleridge’s request for his “opinion concerning your
 Chapter on the Imagination, both as to the impressions it made on
 myself and as to those which I think it will make on the public”
 deferentially with the advice that it is much too difficult for the
 benighted audience of the Biographia:
... as for the public, I do not hesitate a moment in advising and urging
 
you to withdraw the Chapter from the present work, and to reserve it for
 your announced treatise 
on
 the Logos or communicative intellect in Man  
and Deity. First, because imperfectly as I understand the present Chap
­ter, I see clearly that... you have 
been
 obliged to omit so many links from 
the necessity of compression, that what remains looks ... 
like
 the frag ­
ments of the winding steps of an old ruined tower (p. 166).
Coleridge’s ruin would strike the readers of his “literary life and
 
opinions” like “Bishop Berkeley’s Siris, announced as an Essay on
 Tar-water, which beginning with Tar ends with the Trinity.”8 His
 friend concludes by recommending that the imagination chapter be
 deferred until “that greater work
 
to which you have devoted so many  
years, and study so intense and various,” where “it will be in its proper
 
10
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place.” The letter ends, as J. A. Appleyard puts it, with “Coleridge’
s 
expressions of good will toward himself’ (Coleridge's Philosophy of
 Literature, p. 198): “All success attend you, for if hard thinking and
 hard reading are merits you have deserved it.” Not surprisingly,
 Coleridge is only too willing to accede to the plea to reserve his aborted
 chapter for the “announced treatise on the Logos or communicative
 Intellect in Man and Deity.”
What
 
is particularly revealing about Coleridge’s  practical joke of  
a laudatory letter by himself to himself is that it allows him not merely
 to squirm out of a tight spot, but that it aims, characteristically, to
 enhance further his claims to being a profound thinker. He will have
 his cake and eat it too: his dismal
 
failure in the here and now as the  
theorist of
 
imagination will be more than compensated for by some  
greater work in the future, by an all-encompassing Logos that will
 turn relative defeat into absolute triumph. His philosophical preten
­sions go from the absurd to the pathetic to the extent that he has partly
 talked himself into believing them, for the imagination account of the
 Biographia
 
is almost as much a hoax  on himself as on his public. For  
the sake of shoring up his threatened sense of self-esteem, it is the
 saving illusion he wanted to preserve. But as Appleyard points out,
 “after the collapse of the argument in the
 
first volume of the Biogra
phia Coleridge never again attempted a complete description of
 
his  
literary theories.” (Coleridge's Philosophy of Literature, p. 209).
Such is the intricate expository web in which the fancy
­
imagination paragraphs are entangled. By way of lead-in to those
 celebrated pronouncements, Coleridge humbly concludes:
in consequence 
of
 this very judicious letter, which produced complete  
conviction in my mind, I shall content myself 
for
 the present with  
stating the main result of the chapter, which I have reserved for that
 future publication, a detailed prospectus of which the reader will find at
 the close of the second volume (p. 176).
(It should not surprise us that the promised “prospectus” is nowhere to
 
be
 
found in the Biographia.) After the famous definition of fancy and  
imagination, Coleridge winds up the first volume with a pontifical
 gesture:
Whatever more than this I shall think it fit to declare concerning the
 
powers and privileges of the imagination in the present work will be
 
11
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found in the critical essay on the uses of the supernatural in poetry and
 
the principles that regulate its introduction: which the reader will find
 prefixed to the poem of The Ancient Mariner.
The essay on the supernatural too is nonextant, the notice of it being
 
part of the greater tissue of plagiarisms and histrionics that makes up
 the last chapter of Volume I. As for Chapter XIII itself, aside from the
 oft-quoted, enigmatic fancy-imagination paragraphs, it is both farci
­cal and anticlimactic. Anyone who takes the trouble to examine its
 actual contents or those of the digressive sections leading down to it
 cannot take the claims
 
of Coleridge the theorist of imagination at face  
value.
V
Having suggested that whatever unity the Biographia may pos
­
sess lies in Coleridge’s conception alone, and not in his exposition of
 the imagination
 
theory, and having re-embodied the two paragraphs  
usually disserved from the whole by plotting the actual structure of
 the argument in volume I, I conclude with some general comments
 about the Biographia as an expression of the Romantic sensibility
 which reveals more of its weaknesses than its strengths.
Many Romantic works are built around a series of epiphanies (to
 
use Joyce’s term) and frequently build up to a plateau of sublime
 feeling and perception that can have a cathartic effect. Perhaps this is
 the literary equivalent of
 
the grand finale in music, of the climactic  
crescendo, which in some Romantic symphonies (Beethoven’s Ninth,
 for instance) can have an overwhelming impact. The best example in
 English Romantic poetry is probably the concluding book of Words
­worth’
s
 soul-biography, The Prelude, which with the Mount Snowdon  
“spot of time” hymns majestically
 
“the discipline and consummation  
of a poet’s mind.” Other major instances that come readily to mind are
 the conclusions of Blake’s Jerusalem, with its triumphant note of
 alienation overcome (“All Human Forms identified”), and Shelley’s
 Prometheus Unbound, where Demogorgon’
s
 choric close is the philo ­
sophic climax to an entire act of epiphanic celebration. In German
 Romanticism too, the final uplift is just as notable a feature, as mani
­fest in the chant of the Chorus Mysticus at the conclusion of the
 second part of Goethe’s Faust, or in the ending of Part I of Novalis’
 Heinrich von Ofterdingen (which conjures with a visionary fable “the
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realm of eternity”), and the conclusion of his Hymns to Night with an
 
ecstatic unio mystica of love and death.
As a defining trait of many longer Romantic works, the final
 
epiphany serves both as a unifying perspective and a triumphant
 finish — this is the way a positive Romantic ends, with a bang, and
 not a whimper. Such an aesthetic mode has its dangers and pitfalls.
 What if the grand conclusion is bungled? Even some of the best
 Romantic writers come close to disappointing the readers’ aroused
 expectations with a flat finish. Clearly this is one of Coleridge’s major
 weaknesses. It has often been
 
pointed out  that  he had trouble finish ­
ing what he started, and that some of his most famous compositions
 are fragments — a not untypical situation, given the overweening and
 grandiose ambitions of many Romantic artists. Of those he did com
­plete, the most perfect is The Rime of the Ancient Mariner. But even
 that nightmare of Life-in-Death has a rather prosaic ending
 
with the  
proverbial coda:
He prayeth best, who loveth best
All things both great and small;
For the dear God who loveth us,
 
He made and loveth all.
Like the conclusion
 
of Wordsworth’s “Resolution and Independence,”  
it has struck many readers as an anticlimactic homily which under
­cuts the stature of
 
the visionary experience that has preceded it.
When considered in terms of the epiphanic paradigm according to
 which some of the best Romantic texts are structured, Coleridge’s
 presentation of his theory of imagination in Biographia Literaria may
 strike us not only as a dismal explanatory collapse, but also as a failed
 epiphany. He falters at epic length in his theodicy of imagination,
 only to abandon the reader in a rhetorical fog. Again the genius of
 Wordsworth, whose life and work is 
so
 closely intertwined with that of  
STC, presents an interesting parallel and contrast. Like the
 
Biogra
phia, The Prelude is a personal, digressive, miscellaneous and mean
­dering work that has a way of getting lost in the turnings of its sinuous
 structure. But where Wordsworth succeeds in the end with the breath
­taking mountain vision that consummates the search for his poetic
 identity and that embodies the higher unity
 
of his development, con ­
ceived under the banner of imagination, Coleridge suffers a definitive
 failure of vision
 
in his concluding chapter  “on the imagination.”  The
13
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Mount Snowdon “spot of time,”
 
after the monumental, epic quest  for a  
personal past, represents the true Romantic sublime; Coleridge’s
 fancy-imagination paragraphs are the false
 
sublime, the ruins — and  
runes — of a failed vision after a long and fruitless quest. In a sense we
 are back to the loss of his “shaping spirit of Imagination” lamented
 much earlier in “Dejection: An Ode.” The fundamental irony of Cole
­ridge’s failed quest in Biographia Literaria is that without the aid and
 guidance of the spirit that forms unity out of multeity, the poet
­philosopher of imagination can hardly expound a theory of the imagi
nation. Instead of the illuminations of esemplastic power, Coleridge
 
only serves up (to recur to the words of “Dejection”) the regurgitations
 of “abstruse research” that has stolen from his “own nature all the
 natural man,” having by now become the confirmed “habit” of his
 soul. Thus, the imagination quest of Coleridge’s literary self-portrait,
 pursued a decade and a half after the prophetic grief of his great ode,
 attests on a massive scale to the collapse of his “genial spirits.”
NOTES
I wish to acknowledge the support of the Research Foundation of the State
 
University of New York in the writing of this article.
1
 
“The Frontiers of Criticism, ” in On Poetry and Poets (New York, 1961), p. 115.
2
 
Biographia Literaria, Or, Biographical Sketches of My Literary Life and  
Opinions, ed. George Watson (London, 1965), pp. 52-53. All subsequent citations of
 Biographia Literaria are of this edition.
3
 
Coleridge on “organic form,” in Shakespearean Criticism, ed. T. M. Raysor  
(London, 1960), 1:197.
4
 
This recognition has been gaining momentum in Coleridge studies. Norman  
Fruman’s Coleridge, the Damaged Archangel (New York, 1971), is the most hostile
 modern revaluation of Coleridge the man, thinker, and poet. Fruman challenges 
us to realize that the image of Coleridge’s “character, mind and art that has emerged
 from the tremendous surge of scholarly and critical studies of the past half century
 is
 
seriously askew,” (p. xv) and that “Coleridge plain is a far more absorbing figure  
than the exalted seer fitfully glimpsed through the painted mist of illusion.” (p. xix)
 Other notable studies are J. A. Appleyard’s Coleridge's Philosophy of Literature
 (Cambridge, 1965) and Thomas McFarland’s 
Coleridge
 and the Pantheist Tradi ­
tion (Oxford, 1969). Appleyard presents a judicious and balanced summary of
 Coleridge the literary theorist which, although not slighting legitimate claims,
 notes that “the long-awaited analysis of imagination which is to complete the
 argument of the first volume is almost
 
a total disappointment.” (p. 197) and that  
“Coleridge promised to ‘deduce’ the imagination, but he never did so.” (p. 211)
 McFarland works with the premise that Coleridge is 
“
the most profound of English
14
Studies in English, New Series, Vol. 1 [1980], Art. 10
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/studies_eng_new/vol1/iss1/10
96 COLERIDGE’S FAILED QUEST
wrote the Biographia.” (pp. xxiii, 41)
5
 
Collected Letters, ed. E. L. Griggs (Oxford, .1956), 2:864.
6
 
The major recent instance of this is Owen Barfield’s What Coleridge Thought  
(Middletown, Conn. 1971), Chapters 6 and 7, “Imagination and Fancy.” The
 classic example is still 
I.
 A. Richards’ Coleridge on Imagination, which wrenches  
Coleridge’s “imagination” into Richards’ own fanciful context.
7
 
As Fruman observes, Coleridge “suddenly breaks off... having breathlessly  
unloaded
 
tons of ill-digested metaphysics ... as if he realized that,  after all, he had  
little to say on the subject,” The Damaged Archangel, p. 100.
8
 
With these descriptions Coleridge seems to be lampooning his work in the  
process of writing it, a stylistic device of self-conscious irony popularized 
by
 Sterne  
in Tristram Shandy and central to many of the leading modernists of our century.
15
Stelzig: Coleridge's Failed Quest: The Anticlimax of Fancy/Imagination in
Published by eGrove, 1980
